Good. M. T. = Goodwin's Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses, last edition (Macmillan).
Soph. 0. T. 220, the participle, as best understood, is not a true conditional, but a virtual causal, and need not be considered here (Good. M. T. § § 171, 818) .
Meno 94 D is certainly unreal; and Socrates simply repeats there the refrain (first sounded in 89 C) that ' virtue is not teachable,' whatever modification , of the view he may hold or intend to make.
Of the Latin examples, Terr. 3, 29 is an instance of ' partial obliquity ' (or attraction) (A. and G. L. G. § 340, d and refs., Gil. L. G. § 509, 3, Madv. § 369) Finally, in rendering Mr. Bayfield's ' Even a stoic would have jumped if a wasp had stung his nose,' following model writers, I must first determine whether or not I deny that a wasp ever stung a stoic: for the former interpretation, I use only the past unreal formula : for the latter I use iterative, indefinite, general forms, including the Latin impf. subj. in both members.
The rule holds : the unreality, though a secondary acquisition, has become inherent; and the hearer knows from the mere formula that the supposition is, and is designed to be, contrary to the facts assumed and asserted by the speaker. When Mr. Bayfield hears his debtor say ' I would pay you if I had the money,' he knows from the formula that the speaker assumes and asserts his lack of the money, even though he may otherwise know that the scamp has a full purse ; and Sir Gorgius Midas may assume and assert the fact of indigence and say, ' If I were not a poor man.' These assumptions and assertions constitute the whole distinctiveness of unreal or unfulfilled wishes in present or past time: without the concomitant opposition the expressions would be pointless. Independent knowledge may or may not exist, but it is of no importance in determining the value of the formulae.
While I find less to object to in the latter part of Mr. Bayfield's paper, I confess my inability to see any advantage in the proposed scheme of conditional sentences ; for, from what is said above, it follows that the difference between' the sentences marked (B) and those marked (A)' in 2 and 3 is not only that the former (B) ' present the hypothetical idea less positively.' The indicative with av, as distinguished from the mere indicative, recalls and reasserts the potential idea, inherent in its continuative and in its indefinite tenses alike, one of its original implications as the generic mood. In other words the indicative alone may become hypothetical by means of the conditional sign or by an implied relation : the indicative with av is per se modal, like the subj. and opt. And, by a curious irony, Mr. Bayfield must see that an unreal condition, asserting its opposite, is really more positive than a pure condition asserting only relation.
As to A (B), Gildersleeve has finally disposed of that. If Mr. Bayfield seeks novelty in conditional classification he will discover fresh fields in an arrangement by mood-value instead of by time-value ; and I suggest to him as unfinished questions (1) the real time of the apodosis in 2 B and (2) the futureperfect value sometimes included in 3 B, already hinted at.
The distinction in favour of Indefinite Sentences seems to be without a difference. ' Conditional' and ' indefinite' are reciprocals. Everything general or indefinite is so far conditional; and conversely, the conditional is indefinite, though it may be a general principle applied in a special case. The negative used is to be noted. Goodwin seems to have adequately separated the indefinite value in the pronoun from that in the time, showing how they may exist together or separately. My objection is not to discrimination in terms, but to the argument on which this one is based (cf. M. T.
2).
'Sequence' is not well used here. The practical formulae of the ' Sequence of Tenses' (or Moods) have not even convenience, unless the antecedent term can be settled ; and, in conditional sentences proper and all sentences so far as they acquire a conditional value, both terms are settled at once, or each is settled without regard to the other (cf. M. T. § 409) : in neither case is there sequence. And Goodwin's view, that the accord of protasis and apodosis is only assimilation appears to put relation at the mercy of accident (cf. M. T. § 239).
All that remains is to except to Mr. Bayfield's statement that his 'Indefinite Sentences' (Goodwin's General Conditional and General Conditional Relative Sentences) do not use the indicative. Gildersleeve {Trans. Am. Phil. Assocn., 1876) shows that they do, as does Goodwin. Why they should not is difficult to undorstand ; the indicative, as the generic mood, may reassert the potential value that was one of its original uses, and its continuative tenses are specially prone to develop this modal force (cf. Gil. L. G. § 218 R. 1572, 569 R. 1). Accordingly I cannot accept Goodwin's explanation of these indicatives any more than Mr. Bayfield's discovery. Since Goodwin's 'general conditional relative sentence' must contain a double indefiniteness, half cannot serve for the whole; and the indicative cannot be held to ' refer to one of the cases in which the event may occur as if it were the only one-' which, in view of M. T. § § 24, 25, is simply making a difliculty by going beyond the record. (The same objection applies to M. T. § 155, after 56, 57.) And there is no such thing as a ' timeless' tense, neither definite nor indefinite: a present tense may refer to the single, immediate present; or it may refer to the general present, true as a principle at any individual point for repeated or possible acts of the same or of different persons. The tense is present, because the repetition or possibility is asserted only as a characteristic of present time : in past or future it may not hold good. It is timeless only as being general or indefinite by applying to the acts of different persons, which implies more indefiniteness than different acts of the same person.
The indicative of a purely descriptive clause in Latin oratio obliqua is not in point, as the Latin regularly uses the indicative in general or indefinite sentences, but the Latin present subjunctive may certainly refer to a present act with no more of indefiniteness or futurity than mere verification requires. Similarly, the Greek subjunctive and optative may refer to what is now true, as will be found out later (M. T. § § 92, 93, 238, 409, 458) ; and examples cited M. T. 444 will show that a Greek did use lav + subj. for a definite future time. In any case, Mr. Bayfield has not succeeded in proving that the indicative, however it be explained, is not available for his ' indefinite' sentences.
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